The nature of the Treaty provisions on EU external action, with a set of open-ended policy objectives and fewer policy-directed legal obligations on the Member States, has left much to the agenda-setting of the political institutions. The Court of Justice emphasises the need for the institutions to retain their discretion, their room for manoeuvre; it is non-interventionist, tending to take those choices at face value without seeking to define or shape them. Instead it has taken on another role: it ensures that the institutions act within their powers, and that the Member States do not obstruct the formation and implementation of Union policy. It is in fact engaged in establishing and protecting an institutional space within which policy may be formed, in which the different actors understand and work within their respective roles. The principles which have been drawn from the Treaties and elaborated by the Court to establish this institutional space are identified here as 'structural principles'. They include the duty of sincere cooperation, the principles of conferral and institutional balance, mutual solidarity, subsidiarity, and the principle of autonomy.
I. Introduction
My starting point is an observation, based on earlier work on the Court of Justice and EU external relations objectives. 1 This is that in the external policy field, the Court has not been a driving force behind the EU's policy agenda in the same way that it has shaped the concept of Union citizenship or the way in which its interpretion of the substantive treaty provisions on discrimination, competition policy or free movement have been geared to the creation of the single market. This hinder the Union's exercise of its competence, 6 and which do not jeopardise the 'unity of international representation' of the Union. 7 What explains the contrast between these cases and the Court's reticence when it comes to the EU's external policy agenda, and how can we characterise the role that law plays in EU external relations?
The Treaties set broadly-defined policy objectives, or orientations, for EU external action but they do not establish an end-point to which they seek to move the Union. Insofar as there are purposive or set goals (e.g. reduction of poverty, liberalization of trade, sustainable development) these are not objectives which are realizable by the EU alone; it must work towards them in partnership with third countries. And these goals are not prioritised over other EU objectives, such as the pursuance of the EU's interests. We do not find in the Treaties defined policy choices governing external action such as the openness of EU markets or even non-discrimination. 8 Rather, the Union is given a task -to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and international, regional or global organisations -it is given a number of policy fields in which to operate, a range of instruments, and a set of orienting, open-ended and non-prioritised objectives (international peace and security, sustainable development ...).
Against this background the direction and goals of EU external policy must be set by the institutions themselves. As Article 22 TEU provides, 'On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council shall define the strategic interests and objectives of the Union'. The Court is very rarely driven to find that the Union's external powers have been misused; 9 it emphasises the need for the institutions to retain their discretion, their room for manoeuvre. It is non-interventionist, tending to take those choices at face value (basing itself on statements in legal instruments and policy documents); it does not question them, nor seek to 8 Gareth Davies describes the EU's internal policy competences as essentially purposive as opposed to sectorspecific, the former being defined in terms of the power to take measures to achieve a specific goal, the latter being defined in terms of a particular field: Gareth Davies, 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence ' (2015) 21 European Law Journal 2. 9 There have been only two cases where the Court has found that the EC had no external competence. In Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, the Court based itself on its view that accession to the ECHR would have 'fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for the Member States' and would exceed the Community's conferred powers. In Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 European Parliament v Council (PNR) [2006] ECR I-4721, the Court took the view that internal powers could not be used as a basis for external action where the purposes of that action were expressly excluded by the internal legislation. define or shape them. 10 Instead it has taken on another role: it ensures that the institutions act within their powers, and that the Member States do not obstruct the formation and implementation of Union policy. It is in fact engaged in establishing and protecting an institutional space within which policy may be formed, in which the different actors understand and work within their respective roles. 11 The principles which have been drawn from the Treaties and elaborated by the Court to establish this institutional space I call 'structural principles'. They include the duty of sincere (and close) cooperation, the principles of conferral and institutional balance, mutual solidarity, subsidiarity, and the principle of autonomy. By identifying and developing these principles, which by their nature are flexible and capable of evolution, the Court of Justice exercises a formidable role in the governance of EU external action despite its hands-off approach to substantive policy choice. This paper seeks to explore further the nature and inter-relationships of these structural principles as legal norms. It proceeds in three stages. First it offers an explanation for the importance of structural principles in the EU's external relations by exploring the nature of EU external relations powers (II). Second it begins an enquiry into the nature of structural principles: what does it mean to say that they are principles, that they are structural, and that they operate within external relations (III)? Third, it offers a tentative typology of structural principles and some ideas on the ways in which they may complement and operate in tension with each other (IV).
II.
The absence of a telos in EU external policy
The original Treaty of Rome contained only two express external powers: the common commercial policy (CCP) and Association Agreements. These original provisions set no specific end-goals; they gave the Community a field of activity in which to exercise its competence but without specifying the purposes of this action. The common commercial policy, it is true, did mandate the establishment of a policy based on 'uniform principles' but here it is the uniformity that is important, the alignment of the different Member States' trade policies, not the content of the common rules. 12 Association Agreements were simply described as 'involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures'. And indeed we can see that these 10 Legal basis is a good example; while insisting that choice of legal basis should be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review, in practice the Court will normally derive the aim of a measure (important in the determination of legal basis) from the statements included in the preamble which have of course been drafted with the desired legal basis in mind. they are competences to engage in a particular policy field.
In contrast many (not all) of the EU's internal powers were, and are, designed to achieve specific objectives (the removal of obstacles to freedom of movement, achieving a common or internal market, undistorted competition, non-discrimination). And there is an overall purpose, recently expressed well by the Court in Opinion 2/13 as the implementation of a process of integration:
The pursuit of the EU's objectives, as set out in Article 3 TEU, is entrusted to a series of fundamental provisions, such as those providing for the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, citizenship of the Union, the area of freedom, security and justice, and competition policy. Those provisions, which are part of the framework of a system that is specific to the EU, are structured in such a way as to contribute -each within its specific field and with its own particular characteristics -to the implementation of the process of integration that is the raison d'être of the EU itself. 13 The open-ended character of the Union's external competences is confirmed and even emphasised by the Lisbon Treaty, which creates a general list of external objectives in Article 21 TEU, without linking them to specific external powers. These objectives use words (verbs) which serve to orient policy rather than setting goals: safeguarding values; consolidating and supporting democracy and the rule of law; strengthening international security; fostering sustainable development; encouraging economic integration; the progressive abolition of trade restrictions; helping to develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment;
promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. The fact that these objectives are general and not tied to specific external policies emphasises the ability of the policy-makers to engage in their own prioritising and balancing between these objectives which may pull in different directions. It is difficult to see them being used to claim that a particular external act is invalid or that a power is being misused. To be clear: I
do not seek to minimise the importance of these external objectives and their normative dimension; rather the contrary. I wish rather to draw attention to the fact that they do not serve to 13 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para 172. create or delimit competence. As expressed by Larik, 'they provide a sense of purpose as to the exercise of [the EU's] powers through the structures of the constitutionalized legal order.' 14 What of policy fields which do not expressly mention external action but where this is deemed necessary to achieve the Treaties' policy objectives? This latter category of implied external powers introduced by the ERTA case law and now 'codified' into Article 216(1) TFEU is indeed tied to objectives, but these are internal objectives (i.e. the objectives of the internal power on which the implied external power is based). As recently expressed by the Court:
[W]henever EU law creates for those institutions powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the EU has authority to undertake international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express provision to that effect. 15 Article 216(1) TFEU expresses the same principle. The link to internal objectives may limit the scope of the external powers to which they are linked; in Opinion 1/94 on the WTO, for example, The contested decision is thus precisely one of the measures by which the law governing the EU internal market is to be extended as far as possible to the EEA, with the result that nationals of the EEA States concerned benefit from the free movement of persons under the same social conditions as EU citizens. 20 The power to adopt an act with external effects is based upon an internal power because its aim is Thus the argument so far is that external powers do not characteristically establish a foreign policy end-goal but rather a field of action in which the EU can operate, and the Court has not created a role for the law (and itself) in determining the use made of those powers. Let me substantiate this in relation to the four key external relations policy competences: trade; association agreements;
Common Foreign and Security Policy and development cooperation. In the case of Association Agreements, we see the Court accepting the very wide range of purposes to which they have been put, and insisting that their interpretation must be guided by those purposes. Thus in its interpretation of the Europe Agreements with the countries of central and eastern Europe that were to become Member States, the Court recognised their aim of progressive integration of the associated country into the Community and, despite the fact that the agreements contained no general objective of free movement of workers, offered this as a reason for extending its case law on non-discrimination in conditions of employment to nationals of the associated country legally working in the EU. 24 As we have already seen, the degree of integration envisaged in the EEA has led the Court to espouse an internal legal basis for the adoption of a decision to adapt the EEA acquis. 25 This degree of integration was also the basis for a strong statement in Ospelt on the need for uniformity of interpretation. 26 In contrast, when interpreting the provisions on services in the Association Agreement with Turkey the Court has contrasted the 'purely economic aims' of that Agreement with those of the EU Treaties in refusing to apply its case law on recipients of services. 27 These are clear examples of the Court's willingness to accept the specific degree of integration apparently intended by the parties to these different Association Agreements, despite the fact that they are concluded under the same legal basis. The Court has never tried to extract from the Treaties an 'ideal-type' of Association to which it would seek to mold the agreements it is asked to interpret.
In defining the scope of the EU's development cooperation competence, the Court has been guided by policy documents such as the European Consensus on development, 28 as well as secondary Perhaps even more striking, since it involves the CFSP, in addressing a challenge by the European Parliament to the choice of procedure for concluding an agreement with Mauritius on the transfer and trial of suspected pirates, the Court simply went along with the Parliament's acceptance that a CFSP legal basis was appropriate in substantive terms. 34 Despite the boundary between the CFSP and other external powers, which while not such a gulf as prior to the Lisbon Treaty, is still significant, 35 the Court argued the case on purely procedural grounds and, unlike the Advocate General, did not address at all the institutions' choice of substantive legal basis. Of course it is true that neither party sought to contest that substantive legal basis, but since the Court was to hold that the procedural legal basis should follow the substantive legal basis, this would have given it a ground on which to critique the choice of substantive legal basis if it had chosen to do so. 36 This section has pointed to a characteristic of EU external competence as defined in the Treaties, that is, its absence of concrete end-goals. Whereas, in its internal policies, the Union is generally instructed to construct something (an internal market, an area of freedom, security and justice, a system of undistorted competition), 37 in its external policy, the Union is called upon to construct itself, to build its actorness and agency. As a result the law (and the Court) does not interfere with the institutions' choice of specific policy objectives or with the use of external competences for varied purposes. When on the other hand we turn to the issues which define the institutional structure of EU external policy-making, we see law being used, through structural principles, to construct the Union as an autonomous international actor. 
III.

The concept of structural principles
The position I have described, of a Union which is granted certain broad policy fields in which to exercise its external capacity, with little by way of clear guidance in the constituent Treaties as to the ends for which those powers have been given, may seem to have much in common with a sovereign state as an international actor. However the Union, as we know, has international legal capacity but is an organisation of attributed powers; it does not have the autonomous competence of a state that flows from its recognised sovereign statehood. The fact that the EU is a rule-based (international) actor, the fact that it operates through law, that its powers are derived from law, is strongly evident. When we examine the external relations of the EU we find that law is central to the development of the EU as an international actor -possibly even influencing the type of international actor that the EU is. 38 Given the Court's unwillingness to interfere with the institutions' policy agenda-setting, how is it doing this? My argument is that the Court, through an interlocking set of structural principles, is establishing a framework expressed in (or implied from) the Treaties, protecting an institutional space within which policy may be formed, in which the different actors understand and work within their respective roles. These structural principles are both found in the Treaties and developed by the Court of Justice; they structure the system, functioning and exercise of EU external competences and are designed to promote a smooth articulation of the EU's system of external relations and its effective presentation of an international identity. They regulate the relationships between the different actors in the complex EU system, which includes not only the EU institutions themselves but also the Member States and (indirectly) individuals and third countries, so as to enable the creation of an EU actorness.
Structural principles are therefore not concerned with the substantive content of policy, but rather with process and the relationships between the actors in those processes, and their normative content reflects this. What does it mean to say that these are principles? Principles point to a particular direction of argument or line of reasoning. One result of this character of principles is that they may be held in tension with one another without being seen as contradictory or conflicting. Principles may legitimately pull in different directions. This might raise a question as to whether some principles are more fundamental than others, and should thus be given greater weight. Should we seek to establish a hierarchy of structural principles? At this stage it seems to me that the nature of principles is not to be hierarchic; they accommodate each other and a principle may be given more weight in one case than another. That does not perhaps preclude the possibility of determining that the Court appears to privilege certain principles over others.
Let us take an example from a recent judgment, which is a strong example since one of the principles is conferral, which if any might have a claim to be considered especially fundamental. In
Germany v Council
Germany contested the use of Article 218(9) TFEU for the adoption of a Council decision determining the position to be adopted by the Member States in the context of an international agreement to which the EU is not a party. 46 Article 218(9) covers Council decisions 'establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union's behalf in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects'. Germany's argument was that it would be contrary to the principle of conferral to apply this provision in the case of an agreement concluded by the Member States and not the EU. 47 The Court rejected this argument. It did not (of course) deny the principle of conferral, it simply found that it was not contravened in this case, by giving an interpretation of Article 218(9) that -while textual -was fundamentally influenced by the principle of effectiveness. Its argument (following a line of earlier cases) was that in cases where the EU is not a party to an agreement which nevertheless falls within EU competence, the EU may exercise that competence through its Member States acting jointly on its behalf and in its interest. 48 prevented it being used to address a decision to the Member States in such a case, where they are to adopt a position 'on the Union's behalf'.
Since principles are not designed to give a once-and-for-all answer to a concrete question (which does not prevent them from being decisive in a particular case) What does it mean to say that these principles are structural?
Structural principles can be seen as a type of general principle. Some of the principles that I have identified as structural are usually included in lists of general principles: effectiveness, transparency, and proportionality and equality (which are ingredients of the rule of law). Others however are not, including conferral, sincere cooperation, autonomy and institutional balance. I
am not convinced that we gain much from attempting to ascertain whether there is a canon of general principles and that a structural principle somehow gains greater weight by having (also) been categorized as a general principle, or whether all structural principles are to be regarded as general principles.
It might also be argued (and Tridimas does argue) that the value of a classification of general principles is limited. So does it increase our understanding of EU external relations law to identify these principles as 'structural'? I argue that it does, in that it helps us to make sense of the phenomenon identified in the first part of this paper and the very particular role played by legal norms as structural principles in shaping the decision-and policy-making processes of EU external These principles are structural in the sense of defining and being inherent to the deep structure of the EU. As principles operating to structure EU external policy-making they have a specific function. This is both internal and external in effect. Internal in the sense of structuring internal processes (how decisions are made). External in the sense that the legal particularities of the EU as an international actor, 53 e.g. joint participation of EU and Member States in mixed agreements, or the status of international law within the EU legal system, find their source in these principles.
These principles are structural in the sense of being concerned with the process of policy-making rather than its content. In this sense they can be distinguished from the objective-oriented principles of EU external relations policy which we find in Article 21(1) TEU and which reflect the Union's foundational values as expressed in Article 2 TEU, providing a basis for the Union's relations with third countries and international organisations, and playing an important part, along with the objectives set out in Article 21(2) TEU, in guiding the direction of its external policy.
The focus on process rather than policy choice in the role that law plays in governing EU external relations, while it can be seen as protecting the institutions' policy space, may also have the effect of de-politicising genuine disputes. Conflicts are framed, so as to engage the Court, in terms of structural process-related principles rather than policy content and this reduces the scope for open and engaged policy contestation.
What does it mean to say that these are structural principles of external relations law?
There are two dimensions to this question, which are inter-related. The first is simple to state (though not to answer). All the principles discussed here also operate in the context of internal action. security and justice, of an internal market, of an economic and monetary union (Article 3 TEU).
Thus the unity of the market may be an important structural principle for the EU. So also might be the internal space within which freedom of movement may take place, or the mutual trust between courts and between Member State authorities which is at the heart of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the internal market, and indeed (in theory) of Economic and Monetary Union.
In the external context, in contrast, insofar as the EU has a mission to construct, it is to construct the EU itself as an effective external actor. Thus, for example, unity becomes a question of the unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member States. 54 It is given the task to build partnerships and relations with third countries in order to pursue together certain broad objectives. Thus structural principles should provide a solid foundation for the construction of the EU as an international actor, a treaty-maker, a participant in international negotiations. They are concerned with the articulation of power of the EU's constituent parts (including the Member
States, who play an important part in building the EU's international presence). They are concerned with the ability of the EU both to establish a distinct identity as a global actor and to project the policies it has developed, and with its need to operate within a system of international law: hence the need for systemic as well as relational principles, principles that define the operation of the system as a whole as opposed to the relations between its constituent parts. It is this dimension which turns these principles from being simply institutional to being structural. In the next section we turn to look at these different types of structural principle and their functions.
IV. A tentative typology of structural principles
In clarifying what it means to talk of structural principles in EU external relations, it could be helpful to identify two types of function and thus two types of structural principle: relational and systemic.
Relational principles govern the relationships between actors or legal subjects (not norms); the structure here refers to the framework within which the actors in the EU's system of external relations can play their roles, deciding and implementing policy. In its recent Opinion 2/13 on the proposed accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court of Justice refers to the 'specific characteristics' of the EU and EU law, which include 'those relating to the constitutional structure of the EU, which is seen in the principle of conferral of powers referred to in Articles 4(1) TEU and 5(1) and (2) TEU, and in the institutional framework established in Articles 13 TEU to 19 TEU'. These 'essential characteristics' of EU law 'have given rise to a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU 54 C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, note 7, para 104.
and its Member States, and its Member States with each other'. 55 For the Court these principles are the core of the 'constitutional structure' which is specific to the EU and which is based on common values and mutual trust. 56 The common values provide the normative content of the relational principles and are a source of the mutual trust which is a basis for the principles of (for example)
sincere cooperation and mutual solidarity, transparency, institutional balance and conferral of powers.
Systemic principles are concerned with the operation of the system as a whole, with building the EU's identity as a coherent, effective and autonomous actor in the world. They make it clear that structural principles are not simply concerned to define the static relations between actors, but are designed to guide their conduct, to ensure that the actors do in fact act, and that their action is directed at constructing an EU capable of fulfilling the external mandate it is given in Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU.
In the following paragraphs I outline these two types of principle, the aim at this stage being illustrative rather than analytic.
A. Relational principles
In the EU system we can identify four relational axes and each of these is governed by one or more structural principles. Although there is no obligation to abstain from inter se dispute settlement, the Member-States' obligations towards the EU may require disputes to be resolved within the EU framework. 58 Thus mutual solidarity between Member States is both a precondition for the development of the Union's foreign policy and one of the outcomes or expressions of that policy. Opinion 2/13 also demonstrates that the need to protect the high levels of mutual trust between Member States may constrain the EU in the external obligations it contracts, demanding a degree of separation, or autonomy from general international law, in Member States' inter se relations.
(ii)
Member State -institutions
The principle of conferral is important in determining the basis for EU powers and in deciding whether they are exclusive or not. To take a recent restatement of this principle: 'since the EU has only conferred powers, any competence, especially where it is exclusive, must have its basis in conclusions drawn from a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the relationship between the envisaged international agreement and the EU law in force'. 59 In the recent Air Transport Agreement case, 61 the Commission challenged the legality of a decision on the signing and provisional application of an international air transport agreement, adopted jointly by both the Council and the Representatives of the Member States (a so-called 'hybrid' decision). The Council argued that the hybrid decision was an expression of the duty of sincere cooperation. Since it was common ground that the agreement should be mixed (concluded by both the Union and the Member States), the Council argued, 'it is incumbent upon the Member States and the European Union to cooperate closely with regard to mixed agreements and to adopt a common approach in order to ensure unified representation of the European Union in international relations. The adoption of a joint decision is the expression of the cooperation thereby imposed.' 62 In an earlier case also involving a hybrid decision AG Sharpston had accepted that cooperation is an 'essential condition' for the exercise of shared competence and that 'a joint decision is an expression of perhaps the closest form of cooperation'; nevertheless she argued both that 'procedural rules cannot be set aside in the name of the principle of sincere cooperation ', 63 and that the principle of sincere cooperation 'can be relied upon only by an institution acting within the limits of its competences'. 64 In therefore, to cause damage to the autonomy of the EU as a specific legal system'. 67 The principles of conferral and sincere cooperation are, as this case illustrates, closely connected.
The duty to cooperate does not alter the allocation of powers between the EU and the Member
States. Although the duty of cooperation 'is of general application and does not depend either on whether the Community competence concerned is exclusive or on any right of the Member States to enter into obligations towards non-member countries ', 68 what is required by the duty of cooperation will vary depending on whether competence is exclusive or shared. In cases of exclusive competence the Member States may act only through joint or collective action. 69 In cases of shared competence the duty of cooperation is more flexible; it can involve an obligation not to obstruct the EU if an international initiative such as the negotiation of an agreement is underway;
it can involve an obligation to act jointly with the EU institutions in particular circumstances (e.g. while it can be defended it comes perilously close to a denial of Member State competence to act at all. 71 Despite the centrality of the principle of conferral, there have been very few cases where it has been found that the EU has no competence at all. 72 So we could argue that this principle is not in practice so important as a power-limiting principle, but more because it makes clear the role of law (and therefore the courts) in structuring EU external power; it is a principle which establishes the need for a legal structure to EU power. prevented from exercising theirs. 73 This is the case also for the exercise of competence under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The principles governing these complementary competences are coherence and cooperation. 74 We could even see the use of mixed agreements -in particular where not strictly required by the absence of Union competence over part of the agreement -as an expression of subsidiarity. The Union acts, but not to the exclusion of the Member States. In such cases, the constraints on the Member States arise not from the operation of subsidiarity and its effect on the decision to exercise competence, but rather from the principle of sincere cooperation and its effect on the ongoing exercise of competence by the Member States.
Subsidiarity is also complicated by the interaction between the internal powers and implied external powers. The exercise of an internal competence, itself subject to the principle of subsidiarity, may lead to a situation of exclusive external competence on the basis of Article 3 (2) TFEU, and thus the exclusion of subsidiarity at the external level. 75 underlies the conception of subsidiarity, 76 then we may consider applying subsidiarity to the choice between acting at EU level (internally) and acting globally (externally). 77 In this sense implied external powers could be seen as an expression of the principle of subsidiarity based on the decision to use the EU's competence to act at the most appropriate level to achieve its objectives.
(iii)
Inter-institutional relations
The principles of conferral and sincere cooperation are closely linked also in the inter-institutional context. Article 13(2) TEU makes this clear:
Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. The institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation. 75 See for example C-114/12 Commission v Council, note 59. It is of course not always the case that the adoption of internal legislation will lead to exclusive external competence on the basis of Article 3(2) TFEU; an examination of both the legislation and the international agreement will be required. 76 According to the Preamble of the TEU, decisions are to be taken 'as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity'. 
(iv) EU institutions -individuals / third countries / international organisations
The structuring of the EU as an international actor implies the need to structure its relationships with those 'outside' itself, individuals affected by its actions, as well of course as the third countries and international, regional and global organisations with which the Union is mandated to 'develop relations and build partnerships' (Article 21(1) TEU). The fact that we may claim that these relations are governed by principles of EU law, and not simply the constraints of international law, illustrates the extent to which the EU as an international actor is legally bounded. And while it is the EU itself which establishes these principles, it nevertheless conducts those relations within the legal environment of international law. Put another way, the autonomy of the European Union necessary to establish its identity as an actor does not imply that the EU is closed to international law and legal relationships (that EU law and international law are 'ships 92 Ibid, para 64. passing in the night' to use the metaphor of AG Maduro in Kadi I 93 ). The principle of autonomy and its relationship to the task of contributing to the 'strict observance and development of international law' which is at the heart of EU external action -Article 3(5) TEU -operates as a systemic principle, a principle which helps to define the actorness of the EU. But there is also a need to address the principles which govern the EU's conduct towards individuals and its international partners in a relational sense. Here we will turn to two principles in particular: the rule of law (itself a compendium) and transparency.
The conception of a Union based on the rule of law, of the rule of law as a founding value of the EU (Article 2 TEU) which it is to uphold and promote in the wider world (Article 3(5) TEU), and one of the principles which 'inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world' ( The principle of transparency in this context is concerned in particular with public access to documents, and the tendency of the EU institutions as well as governments towards secrecy in matters of international relations. There are perhaps two angles of transparency to consider:
towards the EU public, and towards the outside world. A more traditional approach has argued that the need to restrict access of third countries to information justifies restricting information also to the EU public. 98 However the Court has not interpreted the international relations exception in the Access to Documents Regulation as simply excluding all questions of external relations from transparency requirements. 99 It requires justification in each case that the EU's interests will be damaged. And there are signs that the general expectations are changing: witness the decision (finally) to release the TTIP negotiating mandate. This is at least in part due to a realisation that if the EU is to achieve the aims it has set itself in its external relations it needs to convince not only its external partners but also its own institutions (in particular the European Parliament) and its own public. 100
B. Systemic principles
The structural principles that we may call systemic characterise the type of international actor the EU is, and the norms it produces in its external policy-making. They are concerned with the operation of the system as a whole as opposed to the interaction between its individual components, with building the EU's identity as a coherent, effective and autonomous actor in the world. Autonomy is reflective of the EU's need to project its international identity as distinct from its Member States, and also of the Court's insistence that the EU represents a system autonomous from international as well as national law. The institutional policy-making space which is built and its objectives being orientational and general rather than functional. This is not to downplay their importance, but rather to understand the nature of their role. Policy goals certainly exist, but they are created as a result of policy-making by the Union's institutional framework, giving concrete shape to the Union's objectives in specific situations or on particular issues.
The paper then argues that this characteristic of EU external competence shapes the role of law in external relations. Its focus is not on shaping the uses to which that competence is put, but rather on shaping or constructing an institutional space within which policy can be made. The legal structure thus created is protective of the policy autonomy of the Union, of the powers of the different actors in the system, and has developed principles which govern their relations.
These principles I have termed structural, since they help to define the structure of the EU as an international actor, both internally and externally. As principles they operate alongside rules, they may find their expression in detailed rules (e.g. rules of procedure) and they may help to interpret or apply rules in specific cases. They may complement but may also be in tension with each other.
As structural principles they are concerned with process rather than the content of policy, and this has an impact on the context in which policy contestation can take place and the role that law and the courts can play in this process. The paper identifies two types of structural principles, relational and systemic. Relational principles operate on the different relational axes between Member States, institutions and individuals or third countries. They concern the existence and exercise of competence, solidarity and cooperation, transparency both between the EU institutions and towards the public, and observance of the rule of law. Systemic principles are concerned with the solidity of the structure: the building of the EU as a coherent and effective and autonomous actor. My hope is that this attempt to look at EU external relations through the lens of structural principles will help us to understand better the role that law plays in this construction project.
